We Live in a Society: A Debate
The Anti-Slavery Society Convention (1840) by Benjamin Robert Haydon. Wikimedia Commons.
Preamble
Every man is born free and yet everyone is in chains: [1] This is how Jean Jacques Rousseau saw the world. [2] A philosopher of the 18th century, Rousseau is perhaps the thinker who has most influenced the modern understanding of what is meant by politics and economics. [3] His view on society is reflected in the idea of the social contract, a theory first proposed by Thomas Hobbes. This theory operates on the assumption that an individual’s force is limited and that people must join communities to survive.
Rousseau attempted to answer two questions about the authoritative body (the sovereign) that upholds the freedom of the people: What makes a sovereign politically legitimate? [4] And how can people remain free under the authority of a sovereign? [5] Regarding the legitimacy of authority, he concluded that convention is the basis of legitimate political authority, as nature and force do not provide sufficient reasons. [6] Regarding freedom, he believed that recognising a sovereign involves surrendering certain freedoms, and that freedom can only be maintained if something valuable is provided in exchange for this sacrifice. [7]
Rousseau described his ideal convention — the social contract [8] — as an association that defends each person and their property with the full common force. [9] People surrender some individual freedoms to the collective for the equivalence of safety and greater civil freedoms, and citizens gain a collective interest to help each other. The sovereign thus enforces compliance by forcing the people to obey the will of the people — the general will — and the resulting security facilitates civil freedoms. These freedoms are limited only by the general will and eliminate the effects of physical inequalities bestowed by nature.
So: Is the social contract really a contract? Further: Is a ‘general will’ within society achievable and will this protect freedoms?
Thesis: We live under Rousseau’s social contract.
For by Rebekka Krause
Rather than construing the social contract in a legal sense, Rousseau did not intend for his choice of terminology (social contract) to bring with it all requirements of a legal contract. Although the social contract falls short of the consent and certainty of terms required for legal contracts, this conception is a mischaracterisation of the relationship between the state and its citizens (the sovereign and the people). A better legal characterisation of this relationship would be a fiduciary relationship rather than a contractual one. The social contract theory forms the foundational understanding of our modern democratic society, wherein the state acts in the best interest of its citizens and provides them with certain rights in exchange for the practice of certain duties.
Nonetheless, we can still address the concerns surrounding the existence of consent and the certainty of terms, although Rousseau’s use of these terms do not fully accord with modern Australian contract law.
Regarding consent, contracts are not voidable on the basis that they are merely a poor bargain. Many contracts entered into in the course of business serve as the only option for a commercial entity’s continued existence. A contract for self-preservation does not have to lack consent entirely. This rings true when considering consent as a pragmatic choice rather than a wholly voluntary one. Furthermore, it can be argued that citizens are implicitly consenting to the social contract by participating in the democratic process (even through dissent) or even enjoying the protections afforded by their state.
Regarding the certainty of terms, the terms of the social contract are not totally ambiguous. The unknown future decisions of the state will be a product of the general will, to which citizens can contribute. To this end, a democratic state permits its citizens to shape the laws to better suit them, granting them influence over their state’s future.
Against by Emma Reading
Consent is an essential element of any contract, so if association is the only option for self-preservation, the social contract cannot be consensual. The terms of this contract are also ambiguous as the state’s future decisions are unpredictable, further inhibiting the ability to consent. By accepting a sovereign, the citizens make a decision on behalf of subsequent generations. However, Rousseau argues that alienating one’s children exceeds the rights of paternity. As such, parents force their children to follow the law; as newborn babies are incapable of making the requisite mental efforts to actively exchange their freedoms, there is no alternative and thus no consent. For example, babies do not actively refuse to drive cars on the rational grounds that citizens may enjoy a greater standard of road safety; their parents and guardians who restrain them in the backseat where they cannot affect the steering. Paternity does not bestow rights equal to or exceeding civil responsibilities, as parents must keep their children safe until they are self-sufficient. By this reasoning, states cannot provide each generation the freedom of accepting or rejecting the social contract, which Rousseau considers necessary for the legitimacy of a sovereign to be upheld. Finally, the social contract lacks an exit option. If someone wanted to live free of a state, this would be practically impossible given the entire world is divided into states with their own laws.
Thesis: A ‘general will’ is achievable and will protect freedoms.
For by Rebekka Krause
How can the general will protect minority groups? Rousseau distinguishes between the general will and the will of all, recognising that there may be adverse minority interests. However, the general will is the common interest that is for the best of the community long term, transcending individual preference. Since all citizens are part of minority groups, it is in the common interest to recognise the fundamental rights of these members. The state could never harm a citizen because to harm a citizen would be to go against the general will, and thus go against itself. Although it is difficult to achieve a society where the general will is put before self-interest, this priority cultivates solidarity in a socially oriented society where laws are made for the benefit of everyone. It has been argued The argument proposing that the general will does not always exist evident by the fact that dictatorships are preferable to anarchy in times of civil war. However, this demonstrates that consent to enter into the social contract, as discussed previously, is in fact revocable where the social contract fails to uphold its obligations of safety and security.
Significant lessons can be learnt from Rousseau’s utopian ideas, particularly concerning our duties as citizens. Rousseau introduces his book with the statement that he feels that it is his duty as a citizen to concern and inform himself of civil matters, regardless of the insignificance of the influence he wields.[10] This translates to the duty we all owe as citizens to participate in politics whether that be political discourse or merely informing oneself prior to voting. This is essential to a functioning democracy because only by politically contributing can we stand a chance at forming something akin to Rousseau’s general will. Merely pursuing selfish interests in this political participation is contrary to Rousseau’s concept of unity and mutual benefit. This translates to taking responsibility to advocate for needed change to benefit minorities.
Against by Emma Reading
Rousseau’s concept of the general will fails to acknowledge the diversity of most societies and the subsequent conflicting interests, as the total alienation of freedoms in order to enter into the social contract eradicates any personal interests adverse to the collective.[11] It is evident that the general will does exist to a certain extent, but it is not necessarily a source of goodness. Although widely held morals, such as a negative sentiment against violent crimes, are ratified in the law, many laws are controversial and do not acknowledge negatively impacted minorities. Each individual forms part of a minority, albeit to varying degrees, exacerbating the issue as each individual must thus follow laws that are particularly oppressive. As previously discussed, the general will is also only enforced with authority where those affected by it may consent by voting. However, due to the importance of the law itself, if the state’s sovereignty is threatened, (for example, in a civil war), dictatorship is preferential to anarchy.[12] The general will is thus proven to be paradoxical: it may only be reflected in laws when voted for by the citizens, yet the citizens may not always be able to vote.
[1] Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Political Writings (1762) bk 1.
[2] Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Political Writings (1762).
[3] Christopher Bertram, ‘Jean Jacques Rousseau’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Web Page, 21 April 2023) <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/rousseau/>.
[4] Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Political Writings (1762) ch 2-3.
[5] Ibid, ch 4-5.
[6] Ibid ch 3.
[7] Ibid ch 5.
[8] Ibid, ch 6-9.
[9] Ibid, ch 5.
[10] IbidJean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Other Political Writings (1762) bk 1, intro.
[11] Ibid, ch 6-9.
[12] John B. Noone, Jr, ‘The Social Contract and the Idea of Sovereignty in Rousseau’ (1970) 32(3) The Journal of Politics 696, 700.
This article was originally published under the title ‘Do we live under a social contract?’ in The Brief Edition 2, 2024 — Ceci n’est pas une loi.